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Anankastic Conditionals: If you want to do something, here's a biscuit.

Student Workshop Abstract

In examining conditionals, the possible-worlds account is often adopted, where the consequent is evaluated with respect to the possible-worlds described by the antecedent (Kratzer, 1991). However, in an Anankastic conditional such as (1), the consequent asserts a necessary condition for a goal described properly within the antecedent, without obvious connection to the wanting that the antecedent is itself about. Anankastic conditionals are marked by the expression of intention (*want, intend, hope*) in the antecedent and a modal (universal *must*, existential *can*, deontic *ought*) in the consequent.

Kratzer's model applies the teleological necessity to the nearest possible-worlds in which the goal from the if-clause is true (Kratzer, 1991). Her model fails because it would predict (1) as false when the best way to achieve a conflicting actual world goal (*wanting to go to Hoboken*) does not involve the means expressed in the consequent even though the statement uttered seems true (von Fintel & Iatridou, 2004; Huitink, 2005). Following Kratzer, others have suggested improved models but run into similar problems (Saebo, 2001; von Fintel & Iatridou, 2004; Huitink, 2005; Penka et al., 2004; Nissebaum, 2005).

In order to avoid such conflicts, Huitink proposes to fully override any actual goals (Huitink, 2005). Other authors ignore them altogether by relating the Anankastic to a similar construction such as the rationale clause or counterfactual like in (2) (von Stechow et al., 2005; Werner, 2006; Higginbotham, 2006). However, these solutions fail to address the construction of the Anankastic and different degrees of intention as in (3) will give different intuitions (Weatherston, 2005).

Another construction that has not been fully examined is actually the similarity to another type of conditional – biscuit (also known as sideboard, quasi, non-conditional) – seen in (4) where contributors to work on this subject haven't yet seen the correlation (Fogelin, 1972; Lycan, 2001). Higginbotham has remarked that the first clause for both are not antecedents of a conditional, but instead lead to the actual assertion (Higginbotham, 2006). Other similar constructions such as contraposition (5) and *unless*-clause (6) have been largely overlooked (Saebo, 2001, von Stechow et al., 2005).

In my previous paper, I propose a solution for Anankastic conditionals and claim there is a relation with the biscuit conditionals and show that the account holds for them as well.

- (1) If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train.
- (2) (In order) To get to Harlem, you have to take the A train.
You have to take the A train to get to Harlem.
- (3) a. If you want to go to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
b. If you'd like to go to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
c. If you'd care to go to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
d. If you're inclined to go to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
e. If you're interested in going to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
f. If you're thinking about going to Harlem, you have to catch the A train.
- (4) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.
If you're hungry, there are biscuits on the table.
- (5) If you don't have to take the A train, you don't want to go to Harlem.

- If there aren't biscuits on the table, you aren't hungry.
- (6) Unless you have to take the A train, you don't want to go to Harlem.
Unless there are biscuits on the table, you aren't hungry.

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