

“Linguistic Meanings as Semantic Rules”

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Plausibly, for a word, phrase, sentence or a symbol or more generally an expression to have a linguistic meaning is for it to have the relational property of standing in some relation R to a thing or a set of things it can be used to refer to, a property it can be used to describe something as having, a piece of information it can be used to say, or a mental state it can be used to express. What is the nature of R ? Well, one might think, it's just the *can be used to* relation. For example, one might think that for a sentence s to have the relational property of standing in R to a piece of information that p it can be used to say is just for s to stand in the *can be used to say* relation to the piece of information that p . The first thing I do in this paper is pursue this line of thought and show how it leads to thinking of linguistic meanings as semantic rules.

The identification of linguistic meanings with semantic rules is in fact widespread and has been accepted by philosophers like Peter Strawson, David Kaplan, John Perry, Wayne Davis, Scott Soames, and Jim Higginbotham (Strawson 1950, Kaplan 1989, Perry 1997, Davis 1998, 2003, Soames 2002, Higginbotham 2002). The fact that this identification has not had any effect on how we do semantics is due to the widespread acceptance of *Determinism* about linguistic meaning: the view that the linguistic meaning of an expression *determines* what it can be used to refer to, describe something as having, or say in a given context. If one accepts this view then one can do semantics without having to describe semantic rules, by just representing them as functions from contexts to contents. In recent years several people have rejected *Determinism* in favor of *Constrainism* about linguistic meaning: the view that the linguistic meaning of an expression only *constrains* what it can be used to refer to, describe something as having, or say, in a given context (Neale 2011, Korta & Perry 2005, Schiffer 2003, Soames 2009, 2010). If one accepts this view then one can't do semantics without having to describe semantic rules. However, nobody who has accepted has shown how we could do it. The second thing I do in this paper is to show how one can describe semantic rules by describing their *use conditions* by using a schema like the following ('C' is a schematic letter for descriptions of conditions):

For all speakers x , ' e ' is *permissibly usable* by x iff C

There's several different conceptions of use conditions. First, there's the *Representationalist* conception according to which they consist of the world's being a certain way. Second, there's the *Expressivist* conception according to which they consist of the speaker's being in a certain mental state. To make it vivid:

(*Representationalism*) For all speakers x , 'Snow is white' is permissibly usable by x iff snow is white

For all speakers x , 'She' is permissibly usable by x iff x has some person P in mind, and P is female

(*Expressivism*) For all speakers x , 'Snow is white' is permissibly usable by x iff x is entertaining the proposition that snow is white

For all speakers x , 'She' is permissibly usable by x iff x has some person P in mind, and believes that P is female

The third thing I will do in this paper is argue that we should be suspicious about the *Representationalist* conception and positively disposed towards the *Expressivist* conception for at least two reasons. First, *Representationalists* are committed to the view that every time you say (in the locutionary sense) something false you make a linguistic mistake. For example, if you say (in the locutionary sense) that grass is white then according to the *Representationalist* you've made a linguistic mistake. However, this is highly unintuitive and makes language too demanding (Schroeder 2008a, 2008b). Intuitively, you've followed semantic rules perfectly and if you indeed entertained the proposition that grass is white then you didn't make any mistakes at all. Second, *Representationalists* have a very hard time accounting for the use-conditions of *expressives*, words like 'ouch', 'oops', 'hooray', 'boo', 'yay', which can be used not to express one's beliefs, but express one's non-cognitive mental states and sentences in the interrogative and imperative mood like 'Is snow white?' and 'Make snow white!', whereas *Expressivism* can easily deal with them.

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